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I 
INTRODUCTION 
There is an article written by Gilbert Ryle en-
titled "The Work of an Influential but Little-known 
Philosopher of Science: Ludwig Wittgenstein" which ap-
peared in "Scientific American" in September 1957. Amaz-
ingly~ this title would still be appropriate today, 15 
yeqrs later, in spite of the fact that Wittgenstein is 
a popular figure in Philosophy and in spite of the fact 
that he does have things to say to, or about, the sci-
2 
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ent1fic enterprise. 
The aim of this essay is to explore this rather 
neglected aspect of Wittgenstein's thought. Of course, 
by "neglected" I do not wish to imply that his Philosophy 
of Science has been totally ignored but merely that it 
has not been taken up with the vigor and popularity that 
one normally associates with his Philosophy of language, 
for example. 
In attempting to gain a useful perspective from 
which to view this present attempt, a brief accounting 
of the literature which bears directly on his Philosophy 
of Science will be made. 
Initially, of course, there is Wittgenstein's own 
work, the Tractatus Lo~ico-Phiosophicus. The important 
point regarding this work is that it exerted the great-
est influence of any single work upon the group of men 
known as the Vienna Circle and their subsequent formula-
tion of what came to be known as Logical Positivism. 
Based on an interpretation of the Tractatus, two 
b~sic asumptions are reflected in the.doctrine of the 
Vienna Circle: 
1 - All propositions can be classified as being 
e1ther logical propositions or empirical propositions; 
or, in the event that they were neither logical or 
empirical, that is to say neither analytic nor syn-
thetic, they were classified as meaningless. 
2 - The determination as to whether a given prop-
osition is in fact meaningful or not can be made through 
an attempted verification; in other words, some "experi-
ment" must be conceivable which will verify the content 
of a meaningful proposition. 
Of course, it is generally held that the Tractatus 
1s of an essentially different character than the 
"classical" Positivistic thought of the Vienna Circle. 
The lack of complete agreement on this point regarding 
the relationship between the Positivism of the Vienna 
Circle and the Tractatus, however, is reflected in most 
of the literature concerned with Wittgenstein's Phil-
osophy of Science which we have to date. 
For example, Cornforth in his Science and Idealism1 
equates the principle of verification in no uncertain 
terms with the thought of the Tractatus concerning what 
can and what cannot be said. Thus, for Cornforth, Witt-
genstein is a Positivist who merely phrases the verifi-
cation principle a little differently than the Circle, 
in his (Wittgenstein's) case stating "To understand a 
proposition means to know what is the case, if it is 
true" • 
In opposition to those who would equate Wittgen-
stein and. the LoP;ical Posi ti vis ts there are those who 
1. M.Cornforth, Science and Idealism, International 
Publishers, New York, 1947 
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recognize a certain similarity of approach but who never-
theless assert the uniqueness of Wittgenstein's thought. 
Representatives of the point of view include Max Black 
(A Comoanion to Wittp:enstein's Tractatus1 ), G.E.M. Anscombe 
(An Introduction to Witt~enstein's Tractatus2), and 
others, all of whom note that on Wittgenstein's own 
terms it is quite possible for the question "How is that 
proposition verified?" itself to be senseless. 
Also, it has been noted that what is perhaps the 
most important feature of Wittgenstein's thought con-
cerning Science in the Tractatus is not the principle 
of verification at all l;>ut rather a certain "concept 
of organization" based on his remarks at 6.341-6.343. 
Here he likens scientific theory to the application of 
a linguistic "net" with an arbitrary and pre-determined 
size and shape of mesh. The point being that the "net" 
will determine what information, what facts, ~:re obtain-
ed in any given scientific activity or experiment. 3 
Pointing to this "net theory" further serves to distin-
. 
guish Wittgenstein from the Positivists insofar as it 
represents a certain relativization of the scientific 
enterprise which is not.found in the doctrine of the 
1. See for example p.171 and Chapter LXXX.I 
2. See np.150-5 
). The best accounts of this are given by B.F. 
McGuinness tn his "Philosophy.of Science in the 
Tractl3.tusn and by Black, .2.E·ill·• pp.)47-52 
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V1~nna Circle. 
Finally, along these same lines is the article by 
George L. Proctor entitled "Scientific Laws and Scienti-
fic Objects in the TractRtus". In this article Proctor 
presents an investigation into the nature of scientific 
laws based on "model theory", the theory which is re-
flected, in his opinion, by the Tractatus. 
Now, what should be noted at this point is that 
while the Tractatus is only one of the works of Wittgen-
stein, it has gained the almost exclusive attention of 
those who are concerned with his Philosophy of Science. 
The sole exeption to this would appear to be "Science 
and Metaphysics: A Wittgenstein1an Interpretation" by 
Hugh Petrie which is based on the Philosophical Invest-
igations. This article contains helpful insight into 
Witt~enstein's thoughts about Science found in the 
Philosouhical Investigations but it does have one short-
coming - it is~ a complete articulation of Wittgen-
stein's Philosophy of Science as it is to be found in 
or formulated from the Philosophical Investigations. 
The fact that it does not claim to be so is nugatory. 
Thus the need for a further expression of his Phil-
osophy of Scie~ce appears evident. This is especially 
true in view of the fact that there are differences in 
7 
his fundamental outlook on language as presented in 
the ·Tractatus and 1n the Philosophical Investigations, 
and on this basis one may assume that the fundamental 
foundation on which his Philosophy of Science rests has 
also changed. This assumption, of course, is based on 
the fact that Wittgenstein's thought is essentially 
geared to linguistic considerations and to the character 
of lenguage itself. 
A more specific statement of the task to be under-
taken in this essa.y, then, is that it will seek a clear 
and comnlete formulation of Wittgenstein's Philosophy 
of Science based on th~ Philosouhical Investigations. 
The proble~ of where to begin, that is, how to 
anproach his Philosophy of Science is of no little sig-
nificance in light of the fact that Wittgenstein does 
not speak to the problem with any substantial frequency 
in the Philosonhical Investigations. Thus we are faced 
with the task of determining an approach, realizing of 
course that the choice is for the most part arbitrary 
and c~n only be assessed through the basic suppositions 
which underlie our choice. 
A few observations which will be of assistance in 
gutdtn~ us in the proper direction are as follows: 
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1 - In his "Philosophy of Science in the Trac ta tus" 
McGu1nness notes1 that " ••• in my opinion Wittgenstein's 
philosophy of science need not involve any departure 
from his picture theory of propositions." Generalizing 
this comment, one can say simply that any given philoso-
pher's philosophy of science should be expected to re-
semble the rest of his philosophy. Here one may point 
to the characteristic approach of a given individual 
as viewed through his!!: priori suppositions, termin-
ology, etc •• The inference in this regard is that such 
characteristics will present themselves as relevant 
structuring reg9rdless of the immediate subject matter. 
Insofar as this is a vqlid observation, then, we 
can readily expect Wittgenstein to view Science in the 
Philosophical Investigations in terms of the basic 
themes of language-games, meaning as use, Forms of 
life, etc •• This is to say that his philosophy of science 
should closely parallel his philosophy of language. 
2 David Pole in his The Later Philosophy of Witt-
genstein says "It seems that Wittgenstein's interest in 
Mathematics re~...ained in some sense a focal point in his 
thinking". This statement refers to the fact that one 
can find more or less explicit references to Mathematics 
1. p.160 
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in much of Wittgenstein, in both his early and his 
1 later writings. Once agai~, if this be a valid obser-
vation, than we will do well to direct some effort in 
this direction with the hope that it will better clarify 
his thought regarding science, the supposition being 
that there is a parallel between his· philosophy of 
science and his philosophy of mathematics. 
3 - The final observation, which may be viewed as 
an qssumption at this point, is that his views on Science 
and Mathematics are related to his views on language, 
that is, that his philosophy of language is in a certain 
sense the basis of his philosophy of mathematics and 
more importantly here for us of his philosophy of 
science. 
On the basis of these three observations, an at-
tempt w+ll be made to formulate Wittgenstein's philo-
sophy of science. Our goal will be to show that his 
philosophy of mathematics, which reflects the concept 
of constructivism, is grounded in his philosophy of 
language; and, that this constructivism (appropriately 
modified to reflect the distinctions between Science 
and Mi::ithematics) most clearly reflects his view of the 
1. To qssure oneself of this, one need only refer 
to his Tract~tus, Philosophische Grammatik,Phil-
osophische Bernerkun~en, and most especially to 
his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. 
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scientific enterprise. 
our method will entail tw~ further points: 
1 - Until it becomes necessary in our analysis 
to distinguish between science and mathematics, no dif-
ferentiation will be made. Thus, for our purposes math-
ematics will be considered to be one of the sciences, 
at least initially. Such an approach based on mutually 
~nplica.ble characteristics such as the inherent organ-
ization of both mathemqtics and science will thus be 
utilized. Furthermore it would appear that we have rea-
son to suspect that Wittgenstein himself would have 
followed such a course, or recommended that a similiar 
one be followed. For, the final paragraph of his 
Investi~ations reads: 
An investigation is possible in connexion with 
mathematics which is entirely analogous' to our 
investigation of psychology!- It is just as little 
a mathematical investigation as the other is a 
psycholo~ical one.3 
2 - In order to grasp better the potential feas1- ~ 
bility of viewing science as a sort of "linguistic con-
struction", selected subjects related to the scientific 
enterprise will be reviewed. These subjects will include 
scientific laws, truth, etc •• 
1. My emphasis 
2. A science 
3. It is rather a linguistic one, that is to say, 
one involving the use of language. 
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To summarize, the method of my presentation will 
be to ~ive an exposition of what I feel are the import-
ant central points in Wittgenstein's philosophy of 
language in the Philosophical Investigations. Then, I 
will attempt to show that what he has to say about Math-
ematics in the Philosouhical Investigations and in his 
I 
~emarks on the Foundations of Mathematics is in harmony 
with his philoso~hy of language and leads naturally to 
a. "constructivist" philosophy of Mathematics •.. Finally, 
I will argue that his philosophy of science can be con-
strued analogously as a "constructivist" philosophy of 
science, bearing a marked similarity to his Philosophy 
of ma.thematics. Of course, it will not only be necessary 
to compare Science and Mathematics but also ·:to contrast 
them as well. In this effort I hope to clarify his 
position in the Philosouhical Investigations with re-
gard to the verification principle of the Positivists 
and to explore his so-called "grammatical-empirical" 
distinction. 
II 
LANGUAGE 
It is my intent here to present what I feel are 
the key aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy of langu-
ag~ in the Philosophical Investigations in the belief 
that it is impossible to investigate his thoughts re-
garding m~thematics and ultimately science without 
first possessing a certain knowledge of his views con-
cerning languav,e. 
In so doing, I intend to present key aspects of 
12 
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his philosophy of language only to the extent necessary 
to establish a given position and then to question and 
examine that position. 
· To begin, what is perhaps ~he most basic concept 
found in the Philosophical Investigations is that of 
language-games. Wittgenstein himself tells us to "Look 
on the language-game as the primary thing"(656) 1 • Al-
most immediately in the Philosouhical Investigations 
he notes: 
We can ••• think of the whole process of using 
words ••• as one of those games by means of 
which children learn their native language. 
I will call these g9.mes "language-games" and 
will sometimes speak of a primitive language 
as a lqnguage-ga~e ••• I shall also call the 
whole, consisting of language and the actions 
into which it is woven, the "language-game"{?). 
Shortly after making this observation he presents 
us with a list of activities in order to give us some 
idea of the multiplicity of language-games(2J). Among 
these examples are such activities as describing, re-
porting, presenting, etc •• This sample listing, of 
course, is supposed to impress upon us the fact that 
there is a countless number of language-games, for 
"somethin~ new (spontaneous, specific) is always a lan-
R"uage-game" but "we remain unconscious of the prodigious 
1. Paragraph numbers noted in p~rentheses without 
additional rn~rking will be used in this essay 
to refer to Philosophical Investigations. 
14 
diversity of all the everyday la.nguage-games because the 
clothing of our language makes everything alike"(p.224). 
The analogy of a language-game can accordingly be 
viewed in terms of what Zabeeh1 calls an "open concept". 
It is "open" in two senses: 
1 - As an infinite or repeating mathematical 
series is "open", that ls, in the sense that it can 
always be continued or "added onto". 
2 - Insofar as the analogy lacks any natural bound-
ary. Now, this second point refers to a most' interesting 
observation which ls made by Wittgenstein concerning 
games. In response to the question "What is common to 
all games?" he answers, "You will not see something 
that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, 
and a whole series of them at that".(66) 
This position of his leads directly to the doctrine 
of "family resemblance" and the conclusion that "games 
form a fqmily"(67). The stress ls thus placed on .. same-
ness" and questions of difference are surpressed as 
when in response to the question "How is the concept of 
a gqme bounded?". he remarks that "that never troubled 
you before when you used the word "game""(68}. But, 
1. F.Zabeeh, "On Language Games and Forms of Life" 
in Essays on Wittgenstein, edited by E.D.Klemke, 
U. of Illi~ois Press, 1971, p.330 
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Specht notes that the concept of games is not viewed 
in as significant a manner by other philosophers1 and 
that perhaps Wittgenstein's reply could have been a 
bit more informative. 
Now, it is most significant to note the vagueness 
that is associated not only with the concept of language-
games but with most of Wittgenstein's concepts. The 
significance comes to light when one attempts to evalu-
ate the success of the analogy of a language-game, an 
evaluation that could well borrow Bergmann's title 
"The Glory and the Misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein". 2 
It cannot be denied that the analogy of the langu-
age-game is a most illuminating analogy, one that is 
quite useful in grasping hold of the phenomenon of 
language (as is attested by the popularity of his work). 
Furthermore, it would appear that it is~ appropriate 
that he should feel compelled to use analogies to por-
tray language. A glimpse into the historical use of 
analogy shows, for example, that a tenet of Thomist 
philosophy is that there is a necessity for analogous 
predication with regard to God. The reason given is 
thgt we with our limited intellects cannot hope to know 
1. E.K.Specht, The Foundqtions of Wittgenstein's 
Late Philosouhy, translated by D.E.Walford, 
Manchester University Press, 1969, p.47 
2. Klemke, _QE.cit., pp.25-43 
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Him 1n a direct and absolute manner and thus are forced 
to obtain analogously what we cannot directly. 
Now I contend that Wittgenstein holds a similiar 
nosition, only with regard to language instead of with 
God in his adoption of the language-game analogy. For 
1t is recalled from his earlier work, the Tractatus, 
that l.qnguage forms the limit of my world( 5.6), and 
that I cannot come to have a knowledge of language as 
a whole since that would entail reaching outside of 
the world, which is impossible(4.12). Similarly in the 
Philosonhical Investigations, one can only find meaning 
and thus knowledge in specific language-games, that is, 
through analogy. 
What worked for the Thomists should work for Witt-
genstein, but does it? I think that at best there are 
some difficulties that should not be overlooked. 
Wittgenstein characterized his own work as de-
scriptive, explaining nothing, but merely laying the 
1 different parts or segments of language before us. 
Some individuals, however, in opposition to this 
chgracterization m~intain that it certainly seems that 
his own activity "t~kes us outside this monadism of 
1. Pole, 
p.80 
2. l.1?19.· 
2 It stands over and collates them". 
The Later Philosonhy of Wittgenstein, 
p.84 
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The point here is that there exists a dilemma re-
volving around the necessity of analogous predication 
in Wittgenstein (which he must hold if he is merely 
describing various aspects of language) and the necessity 
of rising "above" individual la.nguage-games (in which 
oase knowledge becomes in a certain sense direct and 
hence analogy needless). This necessity to rise above 
langua~e-games and the problem that it poses _can be 
best seen by viewing an individual language-game and 
asking "On what basis can we determine whether a given 
13.ction is a part of our game?" The answer to this ques-
tion must, I feel, be based on Wittgenstein's metaphor 
of the cogwheel "engaging0 (136), which would seem to 
suggest nothing more than that a given action or fact 
must "fit" properly into what is already given. Seem-
ingly there is nothing adverse in such a concept, but 
Pole ~ives an observation which strongly suggests other-
wise: 
Here we have a luminous metaphor - and 
yet no more than a metaphor. For there 
can be no way of testing whether this 
or that linguistic wheel has failed to 
en~a~e. except to grasp the pattern in 
each case; to arrive at some sort of 
insight into that unique set of rela-
tions which it professes but fails to 
form a part of. 
The point will bear repetition. We 
require an intuition into the unity of 
a complex, a grasp of the way in which 
a set of terms or elements cohere. 1 
1. Ibid, p.81 
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It occurs that one may here appeal to the already 
existent stock of language-games and to the "Form of 
Life" in order to properly be said to grasp the unity, 
the structure of our given language-game, but in so 
doing I believe that we will have side-stepped the 
1ssue. Perhaps the issue can best be put by asking 
"WhRt guidelines were there in the "first" language-
game?" 
The answer can only be "intuition", and by "intui-
tion" I do not mean merely a dec1sion(186) or an un-
necessary shuffle(21J) but a necessary extra-linguistic 
insight g9ined outside of the language-game •. 
Of course, one may say that this "first" language-
game doesn't make sense, it never existed. In answer it 
is held that it~ have occurred based on Wittgenstein's 
own analogy of language as a city. 
Our language can be seen as an ancient 
city: a maze of little streets and 
squares, of old. and new houses, and of 
houses with additions from various pe-
riods; and this surrounded by a multi-
tude of new boroughs with straight reg-
ul~r streets and uniform houses. (18) 
Old houses, new houses - old ~treets, new streets -
there is a passage of time and there is an image of 
growth. It would seem strange to say that I am not al-
lowed to ask who built the first house and how it was 
19 
.bUilt! 1 What I am suggesting is that if we are to con-
sider language-games as houses, it does make sense to 
question the initial construction of such houses and to 
rurther inquire into the "plan" which was used. For, 
while it may be accepted that the historical develop-
ment of language is "hap-hazzard" {as is implied by 
Wittgenstein's analogy), this still leaves unanswered 
the problem of the origin of language, of the first 
houses of the city. 
The traditional view, however, reflects the 
opinion that we assume an existing stock of language-
games and the related metaphor of Forms of Life. 
The metaphor of Forms of life is used only five 
2 times in the Investi~ations and yet an understanding 
of it is of great importance to an understanding of 
Wittgenstei~'s ideas concerning language and language-
games. There is a certain vagueness to be overcome in 
articul~tin~ the concept because of Wittgenstein's re-
luctance to discuss it, but initially it may be viewed 
as "that which is in some sense characteristic ·or being 
human". Seen in such a manner it can be related to the 
concept of gqmes in general so that, for example, it 
will allow men to construct and play a game of basket-
1. See Specht,op.cit., p.182, for a similar criti-
cism. - -
2. Paragraphs 19, 2), 241, and pages 174 and 226 
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llall with a ten foot high rim but will not allow them 
to play with a rim 1000 feet high. In an analogous 
sense such is the case with all games. Thus, the con-
cept of Forms of life serves as a control over the 
creation of specific language-games. 
Further suggested articulations of the concept in-
clude: 1 
A - The intersection of all existing language-
games: a kind of relationship 
B - Something the prime example of which is a 
language-game itself 
C - A way of life, or mode, manner, fashion, or 
style of life, or 
D - One of the formal things in life - some-
thing typical of a living being, typical 
in the sense of being very broadly in the 
same class as the growth or nutrition of 
living organisms, or as the organic com-
plexity which enables them to propel them-
selves about, or to react in complicated 
ways to their environment. 
Now the problem with three of the above accounts 
(A,C, and D) is that they lead to an objectification of 
1. Hunter, "Forms of Life in Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations", in Klemke, 
.Q!?.Cit., pp.273-97• 
.... •")'.. 
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a given form of life and thus destroy the time honored 
phrase th8.t "the meaning is in the use". Only "B" which 
sa.ys that such forms are nothing more than language-
ga.mes themselves survives this criticism which is rooted 
in the very heart of his philosophy. The only problem 
with accepting "B", however, is that it allows the con-
cept of "Forms of life" to be so vague that it cannot 
be successfully applied to all situations in which a 
specific determination is required, nor can it success-
fully oppose the suggestion that this leads to an in-
finite regress of games or at best to a "playful" 
circularity. 
In discussing the relationship between various 
langua.ge-g~mes Pole argues that "Wittgenstein, in in-
sisting on the pluralism of language-games, seems to 
lose sight of the unity of language" and that "If 
these games are to be thought of as disc~ete, it must 
be rather as nuclei in a continuous meium; the matrix 
they are born of is one."1 
I would like to maintain that whatever vision 
Wittgenstein does possess of the unity of language is 
contained in the concept of Forms of life. Unfortunately, 
this reruirk will probably go further toward destroying 
any so-callen unity of lqngua~e than toward establishing 
1. Pole, .QE.cit., p.92 
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the concept of the Forms of life. The reason I say this 
is because while it is quite clear how the concept 
acts unon our game of basketball, it is not at all 
clear how it acts upon .(screens, allows, forbids) langu-
age-games. For there appears to be no criterion, no 
real basis here which can assist us in determining 
what does not count as a language-game. Any activity, 
regardless of how insignificant it may be, qualifies as 
a lan~uqge-gRme within a given life form. We need only 
focus our attention upon it (an activity) and automati-
ca.lly it becomes a language-game. 
Ent we may still ask, obvious as the answer may 
seem, "Is the concept of Forms of life essentially lin-
guistic in character or not?" The answer will bear 
heavily on his philosophy of science, of course. The 
response to be given is that based on all of the articu-
lations of the concept (previously given) it must be 
wholly linguistic in nature. By this I mean to say 
that there appears to be nothing entailed by the con-
cept which Wittgenstein would not readily call "lin-
gutstlc". Later, however, I shall return to this 
question. 
In continuing our present examination of Forms of 
life, we note that Hunter, in discussing the matter 
23 
says, "I don't know whether to say that Wittgenstein 
thought there is an interesting analogy here, the 
drawing of which can make certain things about langu-
age-using clearer to us ••• but what will matter is the 
points about language-using which are brought out by 
the notion, whichever way it is taken."1 
The most important notions, of course, are that 
languaP;e-gqmes are meant to imply sneakin.ir and activity 
(9s opposed to a ststic view of language) and that the 
agreement ~.,hich is necessary between the players of any 
game ( l~.nguage-game) is grounded not within the language-
game itself but in the Form of life. Wittgenstein himself 
notes these points. At (2J) he comments: 
Here the term "language-game" is meant to 
bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, 
or of a form of life. 
And l~ter he notes: 
It is what human beings say that is true or 
false; and they agree in the language they 
use. That is not agreement in opinions but 
in form of life. (241) 
Thus it anpears that the type of possible langu-
age-P;ames and the "progress" (activity) that is to be 
fou~d within them are both ultimately governed by 
1. J.F.M.Hunter, "Forms of Life in Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations", in Klemke, 273-
9? 
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Forrns of 11 f e. 
·The vagueness that surrounds this notion ls per:-
tiaos its greatest shortcoming; however, it ls also its 
grP.atest ~sset. The problems which arise all center 
around the question "What is the distinction between a 
Form of life and language itself (in the widest sense 
of the T>:rord)?" If there is no distinction, and I do not 
believe that there really is one, what is to be gained? 
For, it s~ems that this is merely another term for 
Language, and as such it is simply a new coat tailored 
to the form of the rather tired view1 that man is an 
essentially· linguistic animal, that his unique character-
istic is precisely his ability to use language. Further-
mor~, if in fact Form of life is but another name for 
Language, we can easily see how it is tha~ language-
~ames arise from it; but this surely is not then a 
terribly profound concept. In effect it is no more use-
ful to say thRt language-games arise out of a particular 
form of life than it is to observe that swimming strokes 
arise out of a particular situation - water.2 
Of course 1t is an example of Wittgenstein's genius 
th~t hP did not say that language-games arise out of 
1. Si~ilar thoughts are given by Aristotle, Heidegger, 
and Chomsky, for example. 
2. This is my answer to the so-called "organic" 
account of Forms of life. 
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i~nguage, but rather that they arise out of various 
Forms of life. It ls the same genius that prompted 
him to say that the structure of reality determines 
the structure of language and then to suggest that it 
1s really the other way round. 1 
Wh8t this reflects, of course, is an essentially 
]Oetic genius which just happens to be utilized in an 
investigation of Philosophy. An example of this sort of 
poetic genius utilized in another area (Politics) will 
help to drive home the point. A current political fig-
ure was asked, "What happens if you win this primary 
election, and what happens if you lose it?" He answered, 
"If I ~in, it's like spring tonic; and if I lose, it's 
llke getting the flu." 
The method in both cases is the same. An individual 
is prompted to speak, but when he does so it is always 
through analogies. Sometimes these analogies are rather 
transparent devices used to evade an issue, as in the 
case of our politician who can not admit that a loss is 
a defeat, even though that is what can be deduced. 2 
Hence he builds an analogy, which precisely because it 
~ an analogy allows him to say at a later date that 
what he really meant was that "getting the flu" meant 
that he would ~et sick. But of course people never 
1. Pears, Wit~genstein, p.) 
2. It is further transnarent because he is not 
t~kP.n SP.riously to be a poet. 
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bother to analyse politicians in such great detail 
and so most such analogies are soon forgotten. 
However people do analyse.the words of philosophers 
in detail. And because of this propensity for analysis, 
analogies are more often than not viewed in terms of 
their "richness" rather than in terms of "evasive de-
vices". Wittgenstein's poetic genius has thus all but 
insured a continuing debate which will cease to be in-
teresting only in those moments when it is forgotten 
that his main tool as a poet-philosopher is his habitual 
use of analogous predication. 
Now, a concept closely related to Forms of life 
is the concept of rules. This concept is important be-
cause it helps us to understand to.what extent a parti-
cular Form of life can affect a language-game and also 
to what extent we are "free" to act as we please in our 
construction of language-games. 
Concerning rules, Wittgenstein~ells us (54) that 
they do not have a single purpose, but are established 
for a variety of reasons. Hence we may observe that 
rules are used as: 
A - Aids in teaching a game (Example: Always 
IOOk honest when playing poker) 
B - Instuments of the game itself (Example: 
Brid~e is played, generally, with four 
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people), or 
C - Natural laws governing the play (Example: A 
knight is moved thus in Chess) 
In unison, then, these formulations imply that a 
given language-game must be understood solely in terms 
of the rules according to which it is played. These 
rules, of course, serve as standards1 which on a trad-
1tional interpretation of Wittgenstein are found to rest 
on aRreement. 2 This is the basis of all arguments which 
seek to make him a conventionalist. Moreover, it is 
stressed that such agreements are always arbitrary, 
artsing out of accepted practice. 
Based on the illusory validity of the "con-
ventionalist•• argument, Pole has found warrant to claim 
that "what we have here are two radically different 
views of language. In the one the key notion is that of 
a rule ••• In the other ••• the emergence of new forms is 
seen as part of the essence of the system.3 The con-
cept of Forms of life and the concept of rules are 
viewed as mutually incompatible. 
However, by means of two separate accounts I wish 
to hold that they are essentially related. 
1. Pole, ..Q.£.Cit., p.35 
2. P~~e 226 (PI) is often quoted in this regard 
3. Pole, ..Q.£•£11• p.62 
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Account #1 - Rules can be viewed analogously as 
fulfilling the same requirements that the concept of 
law fulfills in Plato. On this account we find a number 
of similarities. Initially we find that laws and rules 
are both founded on agreement. The lack of the phil-
osopher-king in Plato and the lack of a similar "ob-
jective standard" in Wittgenstein (PI) makes this a 
necessary condition of possible construction in either 
case. Further, in neither case do we find the possibility 
to construct perfect "instruments". In Plato there are 
no perfect laws because every law must be general in 
nature by necessity (a matter of scope) and hence must 
disregard the specific instance. 1 Hence all laws will 
be found to be imperfect if a requirement of universal 
applicability is imposed. 
Now, this is nothing more than a problem of appli-
cation for Plato. Likewise with Wittgenstein, there can 
be no perfect, foolproof rules - for every rule has to 
be understood and applied, and can also thus be mis~ 
apnlied. 
• 
A further noint of comparison is that in both 
cases the "i"'lstruments" are designed to assist us in 
the performance of living. Laws for Plato are designed 
1. See Plato's Statesman, 294b 
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to assist us in achieving an ordered life in the ab-
sence of the philosopher-king (and his unique ability 
to apprehend the Forms). Similarly rules for Wittgenstein 
are designed to assist us in performing language-games. 
Finally, the most interesting point of comparison 
is that both rules and laws are "affected" by a more 
basic concent - one which does not determine which 
laws or rules should be established but which merely 
guides us in our choice. For Plato this concept is the 
Forms (and Nous) and for Wittgenstein it is, of course, 
Forms of life .1 
Account #2 - Rules reflect the possibilities af-
forded to us by Forms of life. As such, they can be re-
garded as sample instances of a probabilistic knowledge 
of the unique character of a given Form of life. In 
such a case if we are granted the luxury .of equi-prob-
abi li ty (which Wittgenstein is quite willing to give) 2 
with regard to individual rule-instances, we can be 
found to possess the necessary tools for Form of life 
"determinations". Now, if such determinations are 
possibile in theory, and I believe that they are, then 
they can·only be so based on the existence of an es-
1. As a coincidence it should further be noted that 
both men utilize some sort of "form" which af-
fects the quasi-material constructs. 
2. Tractatus (6.4) 
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sential ·relationship between rules and Forms of life. 
Rules are normally viewed in Wittgenstein not only 
in terms of games, however, but also in terms of 
grammar. "Grammar, in Wittgenstein's sense, is the 
structure of language, or seen differently, its system 
of rules". 1 It is easy to see why rules can be equated 
with grammar, of course, since the analogy of games 
is after all merely a device in the investigation of 
language. Thus, in language, grammar can be viewed as a 
set of rules which regulates the use of various com-
binations of words. 2 Grammar on this account arises 
and is formulated in much the same manner as other 
rules of games, that is, out of accepted usage. Gram-
mar thus construed is arbitrary, being based on agree-· 
ment - an agreement which Wittgenstein tells us has the 
pragmatic consequence of guiding our choice of words.J 
Of course, this "guiding" feature of grammar can-
not itself be arbitrary because of the fact that 
grammar, like other sorts of rules, is affected by Forms 
of life. Nevertheless, many who have recognized this 
arbitrary aspect of grammar in Wittgenstein have not 
been content with it and have sought to ground it on 
1. Pole, on.cit., p.Jl 
2. G.Hallett-:-Trittgenstein's Definition of Meaning 
as Use, p.189 
J. See paragraph 178 (PI) 
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a more substqntial foundation. Their efforts have most 
often led to the assumption that our grammar is actually 
not as arbitrary as we may think, and that in fact its 
foundation can be found in logic. 
They explain, for example, that the reason why 
we find it wrong to say "I remember what happened to-
morrow" is not because we have merely agreed to call 
such a use of words wrong but because a logical, or 
conceptual, necessity dictates that certain combinations 
of words (here "remember" and "tomorrow") cannot be 
1 properly used. Also, grammar can be used to dictate 
the manner in which individual words are to be used 
(as nouns, adverbs, etc.). For example, in a passage 
from Throu~h the Looking Glass Lewis Carroll notes the 
following violation: 
"Just look along the road, and tell me if 
you see either of them." 
"I see nobody on the road", said Alice. 
"I only wish I had such eyes", the king re-
marked in a fretful tone. "To be able to 
see Nobody! And at that distance too! Why, 
it's as much as I can do to see real people, 
by this light!"~ 
The more serious objection, however, comes from 
those who hold that Lo~ic represents our prime example 
1. An amusing example of this is given in "Witt-
genstein, Nonsense, and Lewis Carroll" by 
Pitcher in Fann, p.332 
2. Ibid, p.311-4 
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of exectitude and that whenever we call (challenge) a 
move in a language-game, our ultimate appeal can only 
be to the principles of Logic. In answer, however, 
Wittgenstein merely notes that logical laws (such as 
the law of excluded middle) serve merely as standards 
or rules themselves and that it is always possible to 
imagine that we should cease to accept these rules 
and to adopt others. 
In this regard I do not believe that Wittgenstein 
has effectively blocked the objection in favor of vie-
ing Logic as a preferred language. He has not done so 
because while it is clear thathe now (in the Philoso~ -, 
phical Investigations) attempts to destroy any hier-
archy of languages he nevertheless is forced to locate 
necessity in the logical structuring of grammar. Thus 
he has merely shifted his perspective from Logic as 
language to Logic as grammar. 
Now the only basis that we are given in Wittgenstein 
for the assessment of either language-games or the 
rules of lenguage-games is the concept of "usefulness".1 
Unfortunately, he says little about "usefulness" in 
the Investt'1':~ttons and so we are still left with the 
question "Useful for r..,hat?" It is much the same case 
1. Specht, op.cit., p.171 
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as with those who would espouse an ethic of efficiency. 
We can always point out that it really makes no sense 
to say that something is merely "useful" or "efficient" 
for these words are used in our grammar in a transitive 
sense, thus implying that there is something for which 
a given rule or action is useful or efficient. Common-
ly held ends include, for example, such things as 
order, self-interest, etc •• 
In Wittgenstein we appear to have this transitive 
usage but no objective. We are told that we play langu-
age-games but are not told why we play them. Now, it 
should be pointed out that this is not necessarily en-
tailed by his analogy of games. In Psychology, for ex-
ample, there are those1 who, like Wittgenstein, argue 
that insi~ht can effectively be gained through an ap-
peal to the analogy of games. In both Wittgenstein and 
Berne we can find varieties of games, all of which are 
in some sense defined by rules. However, on Berne's 
account: 
Games are clearly differentiated from 
procedures, rituals, and pastimes by 
two chief characteristics: (1) their 
ulterior quality and (2) the payoff.__._-----._ 
Procedures may be succ-essful, ri t 
· effective (Wittgenstein's "usef n'8 
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and pastimes profitable, but all of them 
are by definition candid; they may in-
volve contest, but not conflict, and the 
ending may be sensational, but 1t is not 
dramatic.1 
Turnin~ to a typical analysis of a game2 one 1m-
mediately becomes aware of the inclusion of a cate-
gory labeled "Aim" which is precisely what is left 
out of Wittgenstein's concept of games! 
Even if "Aim" can be translated into "motive" or 
even into "value", this thesis (observation) does not 
appear to be diluted in the least. A textual reading 
reveals that Wittgenstein rarely uses the words "motive" 
or "value" in his writing; and, of course, he would have 
no reason to if he remains consistent with a behavior-
istic philosophic account, a radical behavioristic ac-
count. 
This then leads us to observe that there is no 
room here for spontaneity and novelty. Wittgenstein's 
story of games thus becomes a somber picture in which 
human life is merely a series of games, "a process of 
filling in time until the arrival of death, or Santa 
Claus, with very little choice, if any, of what kind 
of business one is going to transact during the long 
wait". 3 
1. Ibid, p.48 
2. Ibid, p.86, for example 
). Ibid, p.184 
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What this slight digression has to do with 
lo~ical necessity is simply this - in Wittgenstein 
we can look for its basis in only two places: in langu-
age-games or in Forms of life. But the vagueness 
which I have ascribed to Wittgenstein becomes most ap-
parent here. On the one hand. it appears that the 
source of necessity lies solely within language inas-
much as Forms of life are essentially linguistic con-
figurations. However, on the other hand. since he does 
not explicitly equate Language and Forms of life, 
the option is apparently left open (even though only 
as a mere crack in the door) to hold that the source 
of necessity is not really in language at all, that 
after all is said and done this view is merely an il-
lusion and that actually its source is in our Forms 
of life. This, of course, is safe to say only because 
Forms of life are only susceptible to a vague probabal-
istic analogous interpretation (as opposed to being 
direct "objects" of knowledge. 1 In conclusion, then, 
I shall hold that Wittgenstein has not really "explain-
ed" necessity at all but has merely given us a somewhat 
interesting metaphor with which to play. 
This point is especially vital to his philosophy 
1. Some comments related to this position can be 
found in Specht, especially see p.159. 
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of science and so I will return to it in Chapter III. 
At the moment, however, I wish to inquire into another 
ramification of the language-game thesis - the constitu-
tion of objects. The need to review this topic should 
be especially obvious in light of the claim of science 
that it does not deal with the "mystical" but with "good 
old-fashioned objects". 
We may begin our discussion of objects by saying 
that what Wittgenstein does is to totally revoke the 
possibility of talking about "good old-fashioned ob-
jects". Now in talking about objects we'appear to 
have two definite options open to us: we may assert 
with the Realist that objects exist in an independent 
state, so to sneak, or we may assert that they do not. 
In the Investi~ations we find an exposition affirming 
the latter alternative, something which must follow 
in view of what has been said concerning language-
games. Quite explicitly as a matter of fact Wittgenstein 
tells us that the constitution of objects is intimately 
bound to grammar, that "essence is expressed by gram-
mar" ( 371), that "grammar tells us what kind of object 
anything is"(3?J). 
It should be remembered in this regard that gram-
mar does not exist as some independent entity but 
rather is to be characterized as a function of a 
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language-game. Thus, we may say that objects are sec-
ond-generation functions of language-games and as such 
can only exist Within a language-game. 
Looking further, we find that the activity where-
by objects are constituted is best described as "organ-
ization". The concept of organization, however, requires 
that we allow several things as given: 
1 - As was noted in discussing language-games we 
must assume an already existing stock of language-games, 
and thus an already existing supply of objects. 
2 - We must assume that these existing objects 
are essentially liguistic in character, formulated in 
accordance with the rules of the games in which they 
occur. 
Granted these two requirements, Wittgenstein's 
"constitution" theory can then tell us how further 
objects are formulated. Essentially, it amounts to 
the argument that we apprehend the "reserve" of given 
objects and in constructing new l~nguage-games we sort 
(sepqrate, differentiate, organize) these existing 
objects in light of the requirements imposed by the 
grammqr of our new games. 1 Concerning the objects which 
already exist, we must assume that the same process 
wi:is used in their constitution when the language-games 
1. See Specht, p.155, ~or an example of this~ 
in which they presently occur were first articulated. 
A distinction between strictly grammatical ob-
jects and empirical objects is not to be overlooked. 
of course. The mi;inner in which this distinction is 
presented to us is through an examination of propo-
sittons which can properly be s~id to reflect the 
"nature" of the objects which they contain. Thus we 
e.re found to have grammatical propositions and em-
pirical propositions. 
A grammatical proposition is one whose truth 
value is exclusively dependent upon specific grammatical 
rules. (Example: A bicycle has two wheels _2!: Every 
body has extension) 1 
An empirical proposition, on the other hand, de-
pends for its truth value partly on the rules of usage 
of the words occurring in them (grammar), and partly 
on the empirical data. 
Now this disti~ction· is quite similar to that 
given to us by A.J.Ayer with regard to analytic and 
synthetic propositions. However, I believe that the 
similarity between the two men on this point is mis-
leading. Ayer is essentially sympathetic with Positi-
vist doctrine2 , and as such the ultimate appeal with 
1. Pp.251-2, (PI) 
2. Especially with his La~guage, Truth, and Logic 
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regqrd to empirical propositions is to their ver1f1ca-
t1on, and the Verification Princiule itself ultimately 
assumed a Realist's world. The limits of the empirical 
are taken on this account to be the world itself. 
Needless to say, Wittgenstein would not accept 
such a picture. For him, nThe limit of the empirical -
ls concept-formation"(RFM, III-29). This blunt state-
ment summarizes a host of observations, all of which 
undermine the purity of the Positivist's verification. 
The most general observation perhaps is that any 
exuerimental activity is conditioned by the terms 
which underlie that activity. On this point one will 
find many examples given by Kuhn, who in his The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions states precisely 
the same thing saying "Scientific fact and theory 
are not categorically se-parable" 1 and that "The exist-
2 
ence of the paradigm sets the problem to be solved". 
Thus one's activity can be found to be governed by 
the paradigm and "to desert the paradigm is to cease 
practicing the science it defines". Wittgenstein 
similarly would say that we have ceased to play the 
same game. To give anexample of this thesis, one 
need only point out that the empirical facts which 
1. Kuhn, on.cit., p.7 
2. Ibid, P':'2~A paradigm for Kuh~ it should be 
noted is like a model or pattern. "an object 
for further articulation and specification". 
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ere "found" under the Phlogiston theory or paradigm 
are riot at 'Ill the same ones which are found under 
current theories. Under the former paradigm the weight 
differential found to exist between a given metal in 
its "normal" state and in a heated state was found to 
be caused by a change in the amount of phlogiston, 
while in the latter paradigm the weight change is said 
to be caused by the effect of exidation on the metal's 
molecular s~ructure and hence its molecular weight. 
The conclusio~: there is no real distinction which can 
be drawn between concept and fact. 
As Petrie notes, "If Wittgenstein rejects the pos-
sibility of drawing a line between the conceptual and 
the empirical, then this indeterminacy should be reflect-
ed in perception as well11 • 1 And, it would seem that in 
Wittgenstein's doctrine of seeing as "aspect-seeing" 
we have a substantiation of this supposition. 
In speaking about this Wittgenstein notes that 
there are two uses of the word "see": 
The one:"What do you see there?" - "I 
see this" (and then a description, a 
drawing, a copy). The other: "I see a 
likeness between these two faces" 
( p .193 ,PI) 
Followin~ this remark Wittgenstein goes into a 
discussion of "noticing an asnect". This he further 
1. "Science and Metaphysics: A Wittgensteinian 
Interpretation" by H. Petrie (in Klemke), p. 
141 
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divides, saying "I must distinguish between the 
continuous seeing" of an aspect and the "dawning" of 
an aspect {p.194)(In this place appears his example of 
the duck-rabbit.) Now what he wants to show here is 
that we often perceive an object ~ another object. 
Exactly why this is so, what causes it, he wishes to 
leave, however, to psychologists (p.19)). Petrie, never-
theless, suggests that perhaps "Seeing as" is "the 
ability (propensity might be better) to play more 
than one game with the object11 • 1 
In reading Petrie one is strongly inclined to 
say that Wittgenstein can be found to reject the pos-
sibility of neutral seeing or perception based on his 
investigation of seeing as "seeing as". Now, if this 
is what Petrie wishes to hold, then I fear that he has 
been led astray. Of course Wittgenstein would hold that 
there is no possibility of neutral seeing, but this is 
not based on his analysis of aspect seeing. 
Aspect seeing (seeing-as) is perhaps the most 
dr~matic side of his account of perception as given 
in the Investi~ations and clearly it consumes the 
most space (number of p~_ges), but neither is it his 
sole account of seeing nor is it the most basic. On 
p.191 he notes that there are two uses of the word 
1. 112.19.· p .158 
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"seeing" and an account of "seeing as" only deals 
with one (explicitly). 
Now whereas the "seeing as" account involves the 
multiplicity of language-games and of objects, his 
more basic account describes the perception that 
occurs within a single language-game and explains the 
perception of a single, as opposed to a multiplicity, 
of objects. 
The key to Wittgenstein's theory of perception is 
to be found, I believe, in his comment that: 
Here it is difficult to see that what 
is at issue is the fixing of concepts. 
A concept forces itself on one. (This 
is what you must not forget.) (p.204) 
And also in his thought recorded on page 198: 
The concept of a representation of 
what is seen, like that of a copy, is 
very elastic, and so to~ether with it 
is the concept of what is seen. The~ 
two are intimately connected. (Which 
is~ to say that they are alike.) 
What he is saying here, it should be pointed out, 
is th~t it is the conceut which is essential, and by 
imulicatiort not the formulation of similies. The use of 
the words "like" or "as" can only be possible when an 
object of comnarison already exists, and clearly our 
problem here is to articulate the basis for any object 
of perceution, including the single "uncomparable" ones. 
4) 
The evidence which I use to support this case 
rests on two points: 
1 - Wittgenstein notes that there can well be hu-
man beings ~ho la.ck the capacity to see something!!.!!. 
something (p.213). This lack he terms "aspect-blindness" 
and states that it is akin to the lack of a "musical 
ear" (p.214). This can be taken to indicate that the 
theory of asnect-seeing is not intended to cover all 
situations and therefore cannot be the foundation of a 
general theory of perception. Rather, it should be 
viewed as Wittgenstein's "special" theory of perception. 
2 - Wittgenstein actually provides us with an ex-
ample of a situation in which his "special" theory of 
"seeing as" does not a-pply in noting on page 195: 
It would have made as little sense for 
me to say "Now I am seeing it as ••• 11 as 
to say at the sight of a knife and fork 
"Now I am seei~g this as a knife and 
fork". This expression would not be under-
stood. - Anymore than: "Now it's a fork" 
or "It can be a fork too". 
Ordinarily then, we do not, can not sensibly, 
appeal to other objects through the device of similes. 
Now perhaps it is because such objects simply do not 
have a propensity to interpretation in more than one 
language-game, but I think that the central phenomenon 
is much more basic than this. 
44 
Essentially I want to argue that "Our problem is 
not a causal but a conceptual one" (p.20)). Insofar as 
this is true, every act of perception is based on the 
concepts which we possess. Thus, for example, ~ South 
Sea native !!!.!.! see something when he views for the 
first time a shiny asphalt tile floor, and to a certain 
extent what he sees will be the same as what I see -
assuming that there are, of course, certain basic langu-
age-~ames which we have in common. These language-games 
which we have in common as physical beings will con-
tain rules referring to solid objects, straight as op-
posed to crooked lines, transparent as opposed to opaque 
surfaces, etc •• What we will not have in common are the 
similes (aspects) generated by dissimilar language-
games. Hence, while I view the floor as asphalt which 
is "like rubber", he will perhaps view the same floor 
as "like tree bark only smoother". 
In conclusion, then, all objects will be "seen" 
through concepts generated within language-games, which 
I shall call first level perception; then, certain ob-
jects will be viewed through a further articulation of 
various Rspects which a given object has in common with 
other objects. This is second level perception. Con-
cer~ing the auestion "Which objects are suseutible to 
second level Perception, and why?" I will decline an 
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answer, siding with Wittgenstein in suggesting that 
such a question is the problem of psychologists. 
Now, I hope that I have shown with some degree of 
clarity thqt Wittgenstein does not make a strict dis-
tinction between the grammatical and the empirical. 
Ho..,.rever, in presenting his position I do not wish to 
imply that there are not any problems connected with it 
because in fact I feel that there are several rather 
disturbing points related to his view of perception. 
The first onjection which I have is that Wittgen-
stein is not at all clear on the relationship between 
the world and language. Does the world exist in some 
sense independent of language and merely become mani-
fest through language? Or are we to assume that (borrow-
ing Heidegger's terminology) the world and language are 
"equi-primordial"? The point is that we are only given 
the language-game analogy, and it simply is not direct-
ed toward the problem of beginnings. Hence it would seem 
that one could hold either position. 
What Wittgenstein would like us to think about, of 
course, is that "the world confronts us only within 
language-games and is thus already articulated in de-
tail and ordered according to the most diverse prin-
ciples" .1 This I will let stand for now, until it be-
1. Specht, .Q.E.cit., p.154 
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comes necessary to reconsider the topic in Chapter III. 
The othP,r problem which I find here regarding the 
relationshin of the graMmatical and the empirical 
centers around "object articulq,tion" in Gestalt psycho-
logy. To point out the difficulty, we are told on the 
one h9nd that the constitution of objects is entirely 
within lqnguage-games and that more specifically it 
proceeds in accordance with the grammar under which 
we are operating. Furthermore, this grammar is not 
imposed but is more or less arbitrary, being arrived 
at by convention. 
On the other hand, Gestalt psychology has estab~ 
lished certain principles of "Form" and "Ground" 
articulation which surely seem to be inherent in a 
1 given figure (object). These articulations, moreover, 
are not apparently "choices" which we possess as pos-
sible views of an object. but rather are held to be 
rigid characteristics of the figures themselves, char-
acteristics which force us to view them in a certain 
W8y. These articulations include: 2 
(1) Orientation - Essentially it is held that 
"there are ma.in directions in space. the horizontal 
and the vertical, and that these directions exert an 
1. K.Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology, 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963, Chapter V. 
2. ni£ 
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actual influence upon the processess og organization 
by making figural organization easier in the main than 
in the other directions." Also this implies that the 
ground is always "symmetrically distributed in all 
directions". 
(2) Relative size also must be considered in many 
instances for "if the conditions are such as to pro-
duce segregation of a larger and a smaller unit, the 
smaller will ••• become the figure; the larger, the ground." 
(3) Enclosing and Enclosed area: " ••• if two areas 
are so segregated that one encloses the other, the en-
closing one will become the ground, the enclosed one 
the figure." 
(4) Density of Enerp:y: "Under certain conditions 
it is ••• pl~usible to assume that within a certain area 
the process energies of figure and ground are equal. 
Then if we hqve a small figure on a large ground it 
follows that the density of energy must be greater in 
the figure than in the ground, proportional to the ratio 
between the ground and the figure area." 
(5) Internal Articulation: In figure-ground articu-
lation, those parts "which have the greater internal 
articulation will ••• become figures." 
(6) Simplicity of Resulting Org~nization:Symmetry: 
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Essentially, the figure-ground distribution will be as 
simple as possible. This is often noted through the 
resulting shapes which will tend toward symmetrical 
formation. 
(7) Centre of Interest: Since it is figures which 
become the objects of one's interest, it must be con-
versely true that "where the centre of our interest 
lies, there ••• a figure is likely to arise." 
Now the problem is that only #7 would seem to be 
"explained" through concept formation within specific 
language-games. Concerning the other six, it would ap-
pear that the phenomena are so general that if they 
are not "caused" by the objects themselves than we can 
only appeal to Forms of life. But did we not see that 
objects were constituted within individual language-
gemes? And yet it seems that this constitution is so 
general that it invades all games and thus cannot really 
be based on language-games at all but is generated solely 
by Forms of life! If so, what are we to make of the so-
called arbitrary nature of the grammar of such games? 
With this question asked I will close my discus-
sion of language and turn to an investigation of math-
ematics, an investigation which should prove quite es-
sential in the quest for a philosophy of science. 
III 
MATHEMATICS 
In this chapter Mathematics will be considered. In 
the last chapter it was argued that for Wittgenstein 
any linguistic activity could be considered to be a 
la.nguage-game. Here, it will be argued that Mathematics 
too may be considered to be a language-game. As such, 
this language-~ame of Mathematics occupies a rather 
UY11que pos1 ti on within the perspective of this essay 
hP-cR.use: 
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A) Historically Mathematics has always been viewed 
as being closely related to the scientific en-
terprise either as an essential component of it 
or as a most convenient tool w:t th·.which to work. 
And, it is only on rare occasion that Mathematics 
is not so viewed. 1 
B) Mathematics is a topic which is most extensively 
discussed by Wittgenstein, and hence his treat-
ment of it can reasonably be expected to reflect 
many fundamentally important points with regard 
to the character of his thought. 
Now, in qttempting to outline Wittgenstein's thought 
with regard to Mathematics, I will attempt to show that 
basic9lly it parallels his view of language; and, re-
membering my contention noted in the introduction 
concerning the assumption of similarities between 
MathP-matics and Science, I will hold as a working hypo-
thesis that what is noted concerning Mathematics applies 
also to Science. Essentially this hypothesis is based 
on the assumntion that Wittgenstein's views regarding 
two or more distinct su~jects or disciplines will be 
simil~r insofar as the various subjects or disciplines 
rnqy be shown to resemble one another. In this regard 
1. See, for instance, Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, 
M~rtinu~ Nijhoff, 1962, as an example of this 
position. Schutz incidentally mirrors much of the 
thou~ht of the Phenomenolo~ical School. This posi-
tion, however, will not be investigated in this essay. 
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we note that Mathematics and Science have a rather 
exact internal structuring, each possesses its own 
special language, each is independent (more or less) of 
other disciplines or "fields of inquiry", etc •• The 
differences which are often noted in contrasting Math-
ematics and Science will additionally be held to be less 
distinct than ordinarily is suggested. Thus, for example, 
the argument that Mathematics may be viewed as having 
a totally "anAlytic or rational" character while that 
of Science is "synthetic or empirical" is softened con-
siderably by Wittgenstein in suggesting that Mathematics 
possesses a certain synthetic character and that Science, 
insofar as it operates within a language-game of its 
own making, may be viewed as somewhat analytic. in char-
acter. This will be considered further, but here it is 
perhaps interesting to note that such "softening" of the 
differences between Mathematics and Science helps to 
strengthen our initial hypothesis. Of course, in 
Chapter IV I shall modify this picture somewhat, but 
such modifications are not essential at this point. 
In the Investt~ations Wittgenstein emphasizes the 
chqracter of language-games as a multiplicity of 
activities by giving us a somewhat random list of ex-
amples (2)). Much later, he speaks of Mathematics as 
an activity {p.227). This I take to indicate that 
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Mathematics can validly be described as a language-
game •. 
In further support of this position the following 
points are noted: 
A - As was the case with language-games involving 
"ordinary lqnguage" so too here with Mathematics Witt-
genstein stresses the concept of "following a rule". He 
notes, for example, that "The concept of the rule for 
the formation of an infinite decimal is - of course- not 
1 
a specifically mathematical one". Further, he notes that 
"The concept of this rule is not more ma·thematical than 
that of: following the rule •••• For the expression of 
the rule and its sense is only a part of the language-
game: following the rule". 
B - For Wittgenstein "meaning" is related to "use" 
and "use", of course, occurs within specific language-
games. This being the case, one may inquire into ques-
tions of meaning by asking, "What language-game is being 
plgyed?" Likewise in his discussion of Russell's system2 
of Mathematics, Wittgenstein indicates that the mean-
ing of certain terms such as "provable" and even "true" 
must be referred to specific systems. 
Just as we ask: "'provable' in what 
system?", so we must ask:"'true' in 
what system?" 
1 • RFM , p .186 
2. RFM, p .51 
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This would appear to be asking the same sort of 
question as "What language-game is being played?" in-
sofar as both language-games and systems are intended 
to be final referents of meaning. 
C - Related to the point just noted is the point 
that use not only establishes meaning within a given 
system of Mathematics but that it gives meaning to the 
entire system (taken as a whole). 
"It is the use outside mathematics, and 
so the meaning of the signs, that makes 
the sign-game into mathematics." 
(fil'.11, p.lJJ) 
Once again, the notions of meaning and use, which 
are referred to here, are basic characteristics of his 
language-game analogy. 
As a language-game, Mathematics displays the 
characteristics of language-games, of course, and thus 
the activity which we term "Mathematics" should be 
liable to description in much the same terms used in 
discussin~ language. Accordingly in answer to the ques-
tion "Whqt is Ma.thematics about?", we would fall into 
error according to Wittgenstein if we answered that it 
described a system of mathematical entities (Plato's 
view) or that it renresented what we could term 
"empirical '2'.eneraliza.tions" (Mill's view), or that it 
represented any atteMpt which was based outside of the 
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activity itself. For, as was the case wi.th language, 
we roust view this activity in terms of the concept of 
~·"If we wish not to, be misled we shall do well to 
direct our attention away from the question as to what 
they1 are about to the use we make of them". 2 
In affirminp; this position all extra-linguistic 
considerations have been excluded from an analysis of 
Mathematics and we are obliged to consider the langu-
age-game itself. 
In defining a game we appeal to the rules of that 
game. In Mathematics we can divide this set of rules 
into two groups, those which refer to the appl1ca~ion 
of Mathematics and those that are related to the 
activity itself. 
With re~ard to the application of Mathematics, 
as for example in the proposition "3 cumquats + 2 cum-
quats = 5 cumquats", Wittgenstein tells us that the 
certainty of this proposition does not reflect some 
contin~ent truth about cumquats nor a necessary con-
3 
nection between concepts. Rather ·its "truth" is deter-
mined by the~ we make of such a proposition. The 
use of this proposition is that we take such calcula-
tions to be definitions of a sort'*' which guide us 
1.Mathematical terms & propositions 
2. A~_AMhrose, ·"Wittgenstein On Some Questions 
in Foundations of MatheMatics", in Fann,p.270 
'· !bid, p.269 
4. Ibid, p .279 
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whenever we attempt to calculate. Further, the applica-
tion of mathematical propositions must not be viewed 
as some type of experiment {p.218) because an experi-
ment implies that the outcome of our activity (adding) 
may go one way or another, but this is precisely what 
we will not allow, this is ~ how we have decided 
(agreed) to use such propositions. Rather, through our 
agreement we have explicitly consented to hold that 
nothing should count as falsifying a correctly formed 
mathematical proposition, that nothing should be al-
lowed as evidence which runs counter to the proposition 
that "2 + 3 = 5" • 
If in fact an experiment is conducted and the 
results do not point to the proper sum, then we natural-
ly assume that either we have made a mistake in calcu-
lating or else that there has been some mutation of 
the objects to which our proposition was originally 
applied. This is to say that whenever we do not get 
"5" when we add "2 + 3" then we are said to have made a 
mistake, to have used the proposition incorrectly. "5" 
and "2 + J" are thus construed as reflecting a certain 
identity - they are held to be "equal" to one another. 
And, because we take these two propositions to be in 
this sense the same, it becomes a rule, for "the use 
of the word "rule" and the use of the word "same" are 
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interwoven"(PI:224). It is because of this that we can 
substitute "5" whenever we see the expression "2 + 3" 
and vice versa (RFM v-3}. 
Now, the basis of this agreement (ultimately) is 
the same as in all language-games, namely Forms of life. 
What we have here, however, is not just another appeal 
to Forms of life but what perhaps may be the best ex-
ample of the relationship which obtains between a given 
language-game and Forms of life. 
An interesting point that has been overlooked by 
all investigators thus far is that in many of the 
instances in which Wittgenstein mentions Forms of 
life in the Irnrestigations, he has just concluded, or 
is in the process of, talking about Mathematics. Thus, 
while we do not find a noticeable proximity of the 
notion of Forms of life to Mathematics at (19) or on 
page 174, we do find their mutual occurrence at (23), 
(241), and on page 226. 
This leads me to believe that far from seeking 
to include the language-game of mathematics as merely 
another game among many, we may actually view it as 
an imoortant model of the way all language-games 
function. 
On pa~e 226 he notes: "I h~ve not said why ma.the-
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maticians do not quarrel, but only that they do not" ••• 
and a little further on that: "What has to be accepted, 
the given, is - so one could say - forms of life". The 
rather amorphous agreement that we all find in accept-
ing that "2 + 2 = 4", for example, is thus pointed out 
in perhans its starkest form, an agreement so basic that 
he seemingly cannot really "explain" it but only feels 
canable of offering a prayer of thanksgiving, saying 
that we can only "give thanks to the Diety for our 
agreement"(2'34). 
Mathematics may not on this account be an ideal 
language (or language-game) but it certainly does seem 
to be capable of best pointing to the extreme general-
ity which is housed in the Forms of life, a generality 
so vast that it is not affected by the fact that we are 
operating in any one of a number of language-games 
such as French or German or Greek or "business". Lingu-
istic relativism does not.negate the possibility of a 
"best linguistic model", one may thus conclude. The 
application of mathematical propositions and terms is 
accordin~ly to be viewed as the acceptance of rules 
based on the most ~eneral sort of agreement in Forms 
of life. 
There is, of course, another aspect of the language-
garne of Mathematics to be considered, that aspect which 
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involves the activity which occurs within the game it-
self. This is the work of the mathematician, and the 
label which is used in reference to this activity as 
it is viewed by Wittgenstein is "Constructivism". 
At this point in order better to concern ourselves 
with Wittgenstein's constructivism, we must turn to 
his Re~arks on the Foundations of Mathematics. However. 
this is only being done on the basis of the observation 
that the remarks presented by Wittgenstein.in Remarks 
on the Foundations of Mathematics are of a piece with 
the thought of Philosophical Investigations.1 
Now in the Remarks Wittgenstein explores Mathe-
matics by focusing his attention on the notion of 
mathematical proof. To begin, he notes that a proof 
'is "a single pattern, at one end of which are writ-
ten certain sentences and at the other end a sentence 
(which we call a "proved proposition"){~ I-28). 
Thus we are given a finite proto-example through 
which the various activities of mathematics can be 
viewed and upon which the various notions that were 
used in describing l~nguage in the Philosophical Invest-
i~ations can be here applied with reference to mathe-
matics. 
OnA of the first notions that we find here is 
1 • .!!.!21• p.vi (Editor's Preface) 
59 
that of rules. Rather than accepting the position that 
the propositions that go to make up a proof follow one 
another logically (logical inference), he holds that 
"when I say 'This proposition follows from that one', 
that is to accept a rule"(RFM I-J6}. 
Mathematics like language is seen by Wittgenstein 
as rule-governed activity. In a proof, the rules actually 
can be called transformation rules and accordingly it 
can be seen that "when mathematics is divested of all 
content, it would remain that certain signs can be 
construcrted from others according to certain rules" 
(~ II-)8}. What we have is a mathematical machine, 
Wittgenstein tells us, "driven by the rules themselves", 
obeying "only mathematical laws and not physical ones" 
(RFM III-48). 
A ~roof, then, provides us with the framework in 
which, or rather around which, the various language-
games of mathematics are played. Viewed in this manner, 
we can easily see why Wittgenstein holds that "a math-
ematical proof moulds our language"(RFM II-71). It 
organizes our possible mathematical moves in the same 
manner that our moves are organized in other language-
games. 
But, one could ask, isn't there a certainty here 
in Mathematics that one fails to "explain" through an 
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appeal to rules? After all, rules are arbitrary and 
yet 1t most surely is !!.Q! the case that all mathemati-
cal activity is arbitrary. 
In reply to this Wittgenstein most assuredly 
would note that Mathematics is essential to our whole 
life (RFM III-52) and that we all depend on the cer-
tainty that is found in Mathematics. But it is a mistake 
to oppose certainty and the arbitrary nature of rules 
because they are essentially related to one another. 
First one must realize that although the rules which 
are first layed down may be completely arbitrary, the 
rules which are subsequently formulated are not arbi'-
trary insofar as they must be in accord with already 
existing rules. To refer to Wittgenstein's analogy of 
the town in the Philosonhical Investigations we might 
sgy that any construction of a new street must take 
into account the already existing pattern of streets. 
(See p.183, RFM) 
Furthermore, he tells us that "to accept a prop-
osition as unshakably certain - I want to say - means 
to use it as a grammatical rule"(RFM II-38), and that 
it is this which removes uncertainty from it. Mathe-
matics must be viewed as normative (RFM V-40) but he 
is quick to say that "norm" does not mean the same 
thing as "ideal". Rather "norm" must be taken to 
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signify somethtng closer to "what is accepted through 
general agreement". In this sense then, Mathematics 
is seen to be a "network of norms"(RFM V-46), which 
is to say that it is a network of concepts and rules 
based on agreement. 
This agreement that he finds essential to Math-
ematics is, of course, the same sort of agreement 
which was found to be at the foundation of the use of 
language itself in the Investigations. Here he notes 
the exact same thing at RFM I-152: 
What does people's agreement about 
accepting a structure as a proof 
consist in? In the fact that they use 
words as language? As what we call 
"language" • 
He also tells us that when we "go through" a 
proof and accept its results, this merely reflects 
use and custom among us, or "a fact of our natural 
history"(RFM I-63). Further, any "laws" which may be 
viewed as an objective source of compulsion (such as 
the laws of inference) must actually be seen as being 
essentially no different than any other laws of hu-
man society (RFM I-116). The depth of our certainty 
is merely a reflection of the extent to which men are 
willing to go in accordance with what has been agreed 
unon, the depth of convention. 
On the basis of this analysis, then, what can we 
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best say that the mathematician actually does in doing 
Mathematics? Well, Wittgenstein notes that he can be 
likened to a landscape gardener (RFM I-166). As such, 
the mathematician may construct various transformations 
(descriptions) on paper in the manner that a gardener 
may plan on paper a certain landscape. In both cases, 
Wittgenstein notes, the activity proceeds without the 
determination of actual use; it makes no difference 
whether or not people actually will "walk" on the 
paths they both describe. The intended considerations 
may be aesthetic, one could say, at this point rather 
than practical. 
"The mathematician is an inventor", he tells us, 
"not a discoverer"(RFM I-167). The mathematician does 
not go out and look for his objects of concern, but 
rather he "makes them up", creating new forms of 
descriptions. But we would be short-sighted to assume 
that these were ordinary descriptions {poetic ones, ex-
perimental ones, or the like). Rather, because mathe-
matical propositions (descriptions) have the dignity 
of rules, they are, once invented, deposited among 
the standard measures (RFM I-164) and can in turn be 
used later to invent still other descriptions - each 
description, each rule, following the rules which 
have .~lrea.dy been laid down. 
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But the invention of description is not the math-
ematician's sole activity, for he also creates essence 
(RFM I-32). This we come to see when we observe that 
while the mathematician is an inventor and not a dis-
coverer, discovery is an aspect of mathematical activ-
ity - an aspect which must be adequately described. 
The description offered by Wittgenstein initial-
ly notes that before something can be "discovered" it 
must first be present; and, that since all other 
avenues have already been cut off (independent math-
ematical entities, etc.), the presence of discoverable 
"facts" can only be found to rest with the mathematician 
himself. 
The reason why Wittgenstein wants to hold that 
the mathematician creates essence can be found to rest 
on the already noted relationship between concept 
formation and the constitution of objects in language 
(here, in mathematics). As was the case in the 
Investi~ations so too here we are informed that: 
••• the proof changes the grammar of 
our langua~e, changes our concepts. 
It makes new connexions, and it 
creates the concept of these con-
nexions. (It does not establish that 
they are there; they do not exist 
until it makes them.) 
(RFM II-31) 
A mathematical proof creqtes new concepts (RFM 
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II-41) which help us to comprehend things (RFM V-46), 
which guide us as we saw earlier to actually per-
ceive things. It is in this regard that we can best 
understand when Wittgenstein tells us that "math-
ematics as such is always measure, not thing measured" 
(RFM II-?5} • 
As was the case in the Investigations the limit 
of the empirical, which Wittgenstein maintains in his 
discussion of Mathematics, is concept-formation (RFM 
III-29). This is important to note because mathematical 
discovery is held t~ be an empirical activity. An 
example of this is given by Wittgenstein in a dis-
cussion concerning synthetic~ priori propositions at 
RFM III-39 to 42. Here he relates that "the synthetic 
character of the propositions of mathematics appears 
most obvious in the unpredictable occurrence of the 
prime numbers." To explain, there is no formula by 
means of which one can derive a listing of primes. 
Rather, what one must do is to arm oneself with the 
concept of "prime number" and then experiment in an 
.qttempt to discover exactly what numbers are in fact 
prime and which are not. The proposition "There are 
prime numbers" is !!_ priori insofar as we can determine 
prior to experience that 1t is in fact true based on 
the concept of "prime"; but, it is also synthetic "for 
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one can say that it is at any rate not discoverable by 
an analysis of the concept of a prime number" exactly 
what numbers they are. Hence the actual discovery of 
primes is held to be an empirical matter. 
Now, what this account actually does is to rein-
force the observation made in Chapter II in which it 
was maintained that the empirical and the concetual 
are intimately related for Wittgenstein. Thus, as is 
plainly shown here, one cannot search for and discover 
primes unless one already has the concept of prime with 
which to work. Not only that, but it would appear that 
for Wittgenstein one cannot perceive any number as a 
number unless one possesses a concept of that number, 
for as he notes, a number in Mathematics is a mark of 
a mathematical concept (!!!11 V-35}. 
But of course the empirical aspect of Mathematics 
does not reside solely in this sort of discovery. 
There are other instances in which experimentation is 
conducted with reference to mathematical propositions. 
These instances tend, however, to overlap into other 
language-games which use mathematical propositions 
and proofs but which one would hesitate to call strict-
ly mathematical. 
A consideration of these instances, Wittgenstein 
tells us, must be based on an examination of the ~ 
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that is made of these mathematical propositions and 
proofs. In discussing the nature of calculating he 
often asks for the distinction between a calculation 
and an exneriment. He of course notes that the con-
nexions which we observe in calculating are connexions 
in grammar (RFM I-128), and that we must draw a line 
between calculating and experiment (RFM I-109), but 
i_t is ultimately how we use something that turns it 
into an experiment (RFM I-160). 
On this view anything can validly be held to 
be an experiment. For example, one normally would 
not consider breathing to be an experiment, but there 
are times (say immediately after being hit hard in 
the ribs) when one could properly be said to experi-
ment with breathing (to find if there is any pain, etc.). 
Likewise with calculating, Wittgenstein notes that 
we ordinarily do not consider it to be an experiment 
to add "?+ 5" but on the other hand elementary school 
teachers do send children to the blackboard to try 
and find the sum of "7+ 5" and other similar problems. 
a further point which is made is that in calculat-
ing we do not allow just any result to be the correct 
one, while in an experiment any result which is ob-
tained under the proper conditions {verification of 
experimental controls, etc.) is accepted. In calculat-
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ing we do not accept a result because we arrive at it 
once, or even many times, but because we hold that it 
must be the result. 
Likewise, a proof is not an experiment because 
unlike an experiment "a mathematical proof must be 
perspicuous"(RFM II-1). We must be able to reproduce 
it easily and exactll every time we so attempt. Now, 
this may appear to apply equally to so-called "re-
fined" experiments, but a further condition serves 
to emphasize the distinction: 
To repeat a proof means, not to.reproduce 
the conditions under which a particular 
result was once obtained, but to repeat 
every step and the result. (!!fil1 II-55) 
To summarize this account of Mathematics we agree 
with Anderson1 that most of the problems discussed 
(following a rule, etc.) may bear different details 
but nevertheless are one in spirit with the discussion 
presented in the Philosophical Investigations. Within 
the scope of this essay that is all that is of interest, 
for as was noted earlier the intent of introducing a 
discussion of Mathematics was merely to find if the 
subject was in fact handled by Wittgenstein in a man-
ner analo~ous with the subject of language itself. 
1. A.R.Anderson, "Mathematics and the'La.ngua.ge 
Game'", in Philosonhy of Matherna.ttcs edited 
by P.B.Benacerraf and H.Putnam, Prentice-Hall, 
1964, p.481 
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On this account we need not attempt to criticize 
WittP;enstein's handling of specifically mathematical 
topics such as Cantor's theorem and Godel's theorem. 
What is of interest, based solely on a desire for a 
"complete" view of mathematica.l activity, is a clari-
fication of the charge that Wittgenstein's notion of 
proof goes only so far as to include calculating and 
perhaps simple elementary proofs such as one finds in 
basic Algebra and Geometry but does not appear to in-
elude "higher level" proofs which appear to be more 
than mere "ma.chine problems" and which actually re-
quire imagination and more often than not vast in-
·genui ty. 1 
My concern is that if these "higher", more complex 
proofs are in fact essentially different (represent a 
different sort of activity) than simple proofs and 
calculations, then an examination of "what mathematicians 
do" is not yet complete. However, I wish to hold that 
Wittgenstein's analysis is essentially complete because: 
1 - All proofs must be grounded upon element-
calculations 
2 - All proofs, as far as I know, exhibit trans-
formations which run in accordance with, 
1. I am specifically referring here to observa-
tions JTIAde by Paul Bernays in "Comments on L. 
WittgenstP,in's Rem~rks on the Foundations of 
Ma.themqtics, in Benacerraf and Putnam, .Q.12• 
cit., pp.510-12. 
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not against, accepted tranformation rules (grammar), 
and 
3 - All proofs, unless specifically memorized 
(structurally), require some exercise of one's 
imagination. ~hus not only does the professional math-
ematici~n exhibit ingenuity through his proofs but 
likewise so does the student who on his own effort 
"proves" the propositions of plane geometry. 
IV 
SCIENCE 
Were Wittgenstein to have written a work entitled 
Remarks on the Foundations of Science, he would more 
than likely have discussed the thoughts he held re-
garding language, merely clothing them with new de-
tails as is the case with his Remarks on the Foundations 
of MqtheTM.tics. This, of course, is what must now be 
shown. 70 
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Early in the Investigations Wittgenstein presents 
us with a list of activites in order to give us some 
idea of the multiplicity of language-games(2J). Among 
these few examples, it is significant to note that he 
has included many of the activities that one normal-
ly associates with Science. Here he has listed such 
things as: 
- Describing the appearance of an object, or 
givin~ its measurements 
- Reporting an event 
- Forming and testing a hypothesis· 
- Presenting the results of an experiment in 
tables and diagrams 
And, perhaps we may also include: 
- Guessing riddles 
Of course, these are activities which one finds 
within Science. And, on the basis of (23) alone we 
really cannot be sure that he intends for us to view 
the entire enterprise of science as a language-game. 
He never relates science and language-games anywhere in 
the InvP-sti~ations (or in RFM). He does speak, however, 
of Mathemgtics as an activity (p.227), thereby indicating 
that we may speak of the many elementary activities which 
go to make up Mathematics in a collective sense. Ac-
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cordingly, it would appear that he is willing to consider 
the multiplicity of language-games not merely in terms 
of a unitary exoansion but also in terms of some sort 
of collectivity as well. This would seem to indicate 
that although he does not explicitly say so, he is will-
ing to view Science itself as a language-game. For 
Wittgenstein, it would thus seem to be the case that 
Science can and must be viewed as any other activity, 
generally sneaking. 
As a 113.nguage-game Science must be liable to 
description in the same manner as other language-
games, that is, through its rules. 
Now, a general description of a science often 
suggests that it is a body of highly organized facts 
which have been gathered through the scientific 
method. These facts are further described as being 
objective, reflecting "what really is". Relating this 
account to Wittgenstein, I believe that he would most 
definitely concede that "organization" is a distinguish-
in~ mark of a science. His feelin~ about this was 
stron~ in the TrRct8tus where he likened the activity 
of science to the application of a mesh or net1 and 
he says nothing in the Investigations or Remarks which 
1. See McGuinness, "Philosophy of Science in the 
Tr~ctatus", International Revue of Philosophy, 
1969, 155-66, for a detailed discussion of 
this point. 
73 
would indicate that he has changed his mind about this. 
However, while he does not contest the view that 
Science is a highly organized activity, he does object 
to our viewing scientific activity as somehow concerned 
with the collection of objective facts which are ob-
tAined through "neutral" experimentation. The key here, 
of course, is Wittgenstein's view concerning concept 
formation both with regard to language in general and 
Mathematics. If we focus on what he has said already 
about concept-formation, we will see that the classical 
notion of scientific activity as being neutral or 
"objective" is compromised several times over. (Here, 
I wish to hold that his view of this situation would 
bear a marked resemblance to his discussion of the 
"discovery" of primes and the construction of proofs, 
of descriptions, in Mathematics.) 
Thus it is noted that there are no scientific 
objects prior to our conception of them; and, further-
more there cannot be any investigation of these ob-
jects until we are equipped with rules by which to 
order our investigation. 
For example, he tells us that "science would not 
function if we did not agree regarding the idea of 
a~reement"(RFM II-72). This infers that prior to any 
investigation there must already be agreement concern-
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ing the nature of what will be found. To determine 
what will and what will not count as evidence is al-
ready to determine what will be "discovered" and what 
will not be. We can only see what the concepts which 
we possess allow us to see. This is the limit of Science 
because it is the limit of the empirical. 
In turn, if we are asked to give the ground on 
which concept-formation rests, we can only answer 
that it is language(I!f11 II-71) itself which in turn 
is ultimately grounded in Forms of life. 
The limits of empiricism are not as-
sumptions unguaranteed, or intuitively 
known to be correct: they are ways in 
which we make comparisons and in which 
we act. (RFM V-18) 
It is, then, Wittgenstein's remarks on the limits 
of empiricism which must be seen to reflect his phil-
osophy, his critique, of Science. To further establish 
this point, I should like to offer the following ob-
servations concerning scientific laws, method, and 
"truth". 
Scientific Laws: Scientific laws are mentioned 
in several places, either directly or indirectly, in 
the Philosophical Investigations. At (54) Wittgenstein 
states that a rule is like a natural law governing the 
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1 play in q language-game. Now, without concerning our-
selves at the moment with the distinction between 
t 
nAtural lqws and scientific laws, it is noted that a 
conceptual association has been drawn between rules 
and laws. Having accepted this analogy, it then becomes 
most profitable to make the distinction between natural 
laws and scientific laws, because in so doing one can 
then reasonably ask for the distinction which is mani-
fest in the opposing foundations of these two categories 
of laws. 
Natural laws, of course, must be assumed to be 
the more basic of the two2 , and as such they can only 
be bA.sed on Forms of life. One can easily see the re-
lt;l. ti ve i nflexi bi li ty of such laws by recalling the 
examples previously ~iven concerning the height of 
bq.sketball rims. If, however, scientific laws are 
considered to be different than natural laws, then 
their foundation must surely be different. At para-
graph 79 it is noted: "The fluctuation of scientific 
definitions: what today counts as an observed con-
comitant of a phenomenon will tomorrow be used to 
define it." In light of this it would appear that the 
distinction which can be formuli:tted as a hypothesis is 
1. The same is held with regard to Mathematics, See 
RFM, III-21. 
2 .on the bA.sis of scone this would appear to be the 
case. For examnle~ while E MC appears to find a 
limit to its qpplicabiltty in smBll-narticle Physics, 
"Al 1 men must d 1 e" does not at>near sub.1ec t to 
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that scientific laws are arbitrary. 
Of course, one could ask whether such laws are 
completely arbitrary; and if they are not, then what 
prevents them from so being. 
In attempting to answer this sort of question, it 
should be pointed out that there are still other types 
of laws - traffic laws, laws of social conduct, etc. -
and that these laws too must be distinguished from 
natural and scientific laws. Paragraph 54 does pre-
cisely this, Wittgenstein pointing out here that 
there are many types of rules (here laws), each dis-
tinguished by the use which is associated with them. 
Concerning these latter types of laws, Wittgen-
stein would hold that they are the closest things to 
1 purely arbitrary propositions which we could imagine. 
But if this is actually the case, then scientific laws 
are not completely arbitrary, or rather they are less 
arbitrary than laws formulated through convention. 
As such, the following continuum could be visualized: 
Natural laws 
Scientific laws 
Other laws(social, traffic,etc.) 
Absolute free action(No laws) 
1. I do not say thqt they are Rbsolutely arbitrary in 
ni:t.ture bPc~use the concent of Forms of life must affect 
qll Acivity if it (Forms of life) is to have anything 
but ~ t~utolo~ical significance. 
?7 
Noting this situation, one can only offer the 
suggestion that perhaps the above construction re-
flects a certain relative proximity or engagement with 
Wittgenstein's Forms of life.1 If this is the case, then 
a new meaning can be attached to his analogy at (136) 
where he speaks of engagement with the concept of 
truth (as with a cogwheel). 
Of course, l t: "rculd be wrong to hold that all 
of our activity is geared toward reaching Forms of 
life as if it were some sort of ideal entity (recall-
ing Pl9to's analogy of the line in the Republic.) For 
if we were to do this, we would be in violation of the 
limit imposed by language as the "limit of the world". 
Nevertheless, if there is a definite gradation by means 
of which one can distinguish the various types of laws, 
then we must be prepared to assume some sort of "es-
sence" or entity toward which they are inclined (real-
1zin~ that such a goal need not be referred to as an 
"ideal" but merely as some "most fundamental aspect" 
of reality). 
Once agqin, our problem is with a proper inter-
nretqtion of "Forms of life". The one which begins to 
'2;i:i1.ri some nl~usibili ty is that "Forms of life" is 
1. It hBs been su~gested thqt instead of present-
in~ a vertically-oriented line, an alternative 
might be to present a horizontally~oriented, 
sl0ned line, placing "Forms of life" above it. 
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perhaps closest to being a sociological concept. This 
is based on the observation that if "Forms of life" is 
merely a linguistic construct, then it would appear 
necessary to adopt a circular rather than a linear 
"scale" of laws, language being the hub of them all. 
But if we hold to differentiation based on degrees of 
"arbitrariness", then we are forced tp point toward the 
1 
source of arbitrary decision - society. The effect that 
this would have if accepted is to ground Wittgenstein's 
philosophy of language in the social. Regardless of 
how far one must go before he feels satisfied, whether 
one merely stops with the mere mention of Forms of life 
or whether one suspects the need for further alalysis 
and consequent elucidation, it should be clear that 
one cannot observe Wittgenstein clearly until some 
attempt is made to look directly into the sun, that is, 
for ori~ins or ultimate foundations. 
Scientific Truth: There is no distinction which 
can be found in the Investigations (or BFM) between 
scientific truth and "non-scientific" truth. Thus, if 
one is to talk a.bout scientific truth, it must only 
be through a discussion of truth in general. 
In the Investis:rations there are several places 
1. This admittedly is a radical interpretation of 
Wittgenstein, but one which would not make him a 
Sociologist as much as a Sociologist of knowledge. 
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wher the word "truth" is used; these are the follow-
ing: paragraph 22, 136-7, 225, 544, and pages 222-J. 
Also, the following passages can be cited: paragraphs 
433-?, 44)-9, and 461-5. 
From all of these, the most helpful to this pro-
ject are 136 and 461-5. Taken together they asy about 
truth that: 
A - It is essentially related to language, and 
B - It is reflected in a "proper fit" of all the 
facts. 
At 461-5 Wittgenstein asks whether an order antici-
pates its execution and whether a wish can be said to 
determine what is going to be the case. Both of these, 
of course, reflect similar situations insofar as they 
can be put into the form of a more abstract question 
of whether any linguistic activity determines what 
will or will not be found to be the case. In answer 
to this it is noted at {465): 
Suppose you now ask: then are facts de-
fined one way or the other by an expect-
ation - that is, is it defined for what-
ever event may .occur whether it fulfills 
the expectation or not? The answer has to 
be: "Yes, unless the expression of the ex-
pectation is indefinite; for example, 
contains a disjunction of different pos-
sibilities." 
A similar answer is given by J.R. Lucas in his 
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article "On Not Worshipping Facts". From his point 
of view (which is here sketched because of its re-
semblqnce with Wittgenstein's position) facts are not 
"good, simple souls"; they are not the "simple solid 
elements out of which the whole fabric of our knowledge 
is constructed. 1 As a matter of fact, the word "fact" 
is systematically ambiguous, its meaning varying with 
its context. Thus we can speak of fact vs value, fact 
Y! interpretation, fact vs fiction, fact vs theory, 
2 
etc •• 
In spite of this, one can in general say that 
facts represent Points of agreement3, and that when 
they are construed in terms of the word "true" this 
agreement is qualified a.s "unquestioned" or "established", 
or "accepted". 
This qualification, of course, is grounded in 
what a reasonable man living at a given time would 
concede as true. Thus, Lucas concludes that "Facts 
do not make the reasonable man, the reasonable man 
makes the facts". And, those things which he would 
not call a fact (in Science) would instead be called 
a theory or a hypothesis or perhaps a mere speculation. 
Not-1, what Lucas says about facts and what Wittgen-
1. See "Philosophical Quarterly", 8(1958), p.144 
2. I bid, p .152 
3 • I bid , p • 146 
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stein says about laws are closely related, specifically 
insofar as both men demand a foundation which con-
sists of agreement. Truth is then viewed in terms of 
a qualification which is imposed on this agreement. 
For Lucas it is that this agreement must be made by 
all "reasonable men of a ·given era". For Wittgenstein 
it i,s in Forms of life. At (224) he stresses the vital 
role of agreement with regard to language-games saying: 
The word "agreement" and the word 
"rule" are related to one another, 
they are cousins. If I teach any-
one the use of the one word, he 
learns the use of the other with it. 
But still, agreement in itself cannot be the only 
ground for determining truth. One must, as it were, 
stress even more strongly the concepts of "reasonable 
men" and "Forms of life"1 , otherwise everything can be 
allowed as true. 
On page 149 Lucas notes that "Agreement is not 
enough to establish truth." And, that "Whenever we 
say of anything that it is a fact it is always 
logically possible that it might not be true and there-
fore not a fact; though we are not on that account un-
justified in believing to be true what we believe to 
be true. We can no other." 
1. Which, of course, are not at all the same · 
things but which share a similar role for 
the respective authors as they are held to 
be ultimate "bqckdrops". 
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Here for Wittgenstein enters the second consider-
ation with regard to truth: there must be a "proper . 
fit" of all the facts. Once again we are led to (136) 
and the image of a fact {proposition) engaging with 
the concept of truth (as with a cogwheel). 
The procedure appears to be clear - one should 
strive for unity, allowing what fits and discarding 
what does not by comparing each new fact, each new 
proposition, with the overall game as it is being 
played. The problem with this has already been pre-
sented, of course. 1 
Scientific Method: What Wittgenstein has to say 
about "method" in general can be summarized as follows: 
1 - There is not ~ method, but many methods, 
each of which lies on a somewhat arbitrary basis, and 
2 - Each method must be viewed within a particular 
context. 
At (133) Wittgenstei'n notes that the philosophical 
method is not ~ method, though there are indeed 
methods, like different therapies. This passage is 
directed most obviously toward an account of "what 
philosophers do" and contains the rather common 
observation that not only do different "schools" of 
philosophy tend towards different subjects of interest 
1 • See pp .15-1 7 
8J 
but that they employ different methods as well. The 
conclusion here is that there are a variety of language-
games, each played according to its own rules, within 
Philosophy; and, the implication is that each method 
must be judged solely in terms of the philosophical 
language-game in which it is being used. Hence one 
cannot say that one method is better or worse than 
another because there simply is no absolute standard 
by which all m~thods can be judged. 
But of course if there is no absolute standard 
then we are pretty much free to choose whichever 
method best suits our purpose. On this account it 
should not be surprising at all to find a linguistic 
method, a transcendental method, a pseudo-psychological 
method, etc. all living within the same philosophical 
house •1 
Now this absolute standard, if it did exist, 
would of necessity be presented in terms of some ab-
solute "truth". Quite clearly then it is this lack of 
such t:l.n absolute "truth", which has already been noted, 
which not only allows but in a certain sense necessiti-
tAtes the use of a variety of methods. 
1. It should be noted that this possibility of 
various methods in no way runs counter to the 
linegr representation of laws which I have al-
reAdy presented. Analo~ously, one might compare 
the affect of natural laws to the laws of Ches~ 
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Recalling Witgenstein's notions concerning the 
concept of truth, it can be agreed that not only is 
there a lack of an absolute standard in Philosophy 
but in all linguistic activites, and since Science 
1s for Wittgenstein an essentially linguistic activity 
there can be no absolute standard of truth within it 
either. 
Can what is stated explicitly at (lJJ) with 
re~ard to Philosophy be extended to include 
Science (or any other language-game)? If it can be, 
then there is not and cannot be ~ scientific method 
but instead one must speak of scientific methods. One 
need only consider the varied approaches taken in the 
sciences to confirm this view, the dissimilar approaches 
taken in Physics, Biology, and Antropology, for example. 
However, there are those who hold that the various 
methods of Science can in fact be viewed as one be-
cause they all operate within a framework of verifica-
tion. (It is on this ground that the Positivists had 
strived for a "unified science.) 
Verificqtionism becomes meaningless as a unique 
chqracteristic of Science, however, in light of Witt-
noting that as the laws of Chess do not dictate 
an absolute procedure towards checkmate, neither 
do the l~ws of nature dictate the various ap-
proaches that mqy be followed in Science or Phil-
osophy or any other field. 
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genstein's thoughts on concept-formation. Essentially 
this is so because verification as we have seen merely 
deals with the emprical and Wittgenstein has shown 
that we cannot stop with the empirical but must also 
deal with the conceptual, the linguistic. An example 
given by Anscombe1 suggests the distinction: 
Wittgenstein asks: "Why do people say 
that it was natural to think that the 
sun went round the earth rather than 
that the earth turned on its axis?" 
Anscombe replies: "I suppose, because 
it looked as if the sun went round the 
earth." 
"Well", he asked, "what would it have 
looked like if it had looked as if the 
earth turned on its axis?" 
What Wittgenstein wants to do here is to point 
out the grammatical significance attached to the 
phrase "it looked as if". At (353) he notes: 
Asking whether and how a proposition 
can be verified is only a particular 
way of asking "Wie meinst du das?" 
The answer is a contribution to the 
grammar of the proposition. 
Also, it should be noted that verificationism 
only makes sense if there is an unquestioned standard, 
the empirical, through which a given operation can be 
discerned from another. Wittgenstein, as we have seen, 
denies us this standard and hence can only allow a 
1. Frorn·Anscornbe, An Introduction to Wittgen-
stein's Tractatus, p.151 
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certain sort of conceptual verification which. as was 
the case with the mathematical primes, can only amount 
to an affirmation of the concepts which are already 
displqyed. Thus, we can "verify" new concepts which 
we create only through concepts that we already hold. 
in this way continuing and correcting the description, 
the gardener's Pathway, which is continually being con-
structed. 
In summary, then Wittgenstein would point to 
Science as a language-game. Within this language-game 
the most prominent feature, of course, is that it is 
rule-governed activity1 , the specifiic rules of this 
language-game forming what Wittgenstein refers to as 
its grammar. 2 This grammar, furthermore, reflects a 
certain agreement among those who use it. but this 
agreement is not based on the purely arbitrary deci-
sions of those involved with it but rather is based on 
the Form of life in which the participants of a specific 
languqge-game find themselves. 
The notion of empirical verification, which may 
hold to be the vital point' in favor of scientific know-
ledge as the only knowledge worth considering, is 
1. This position, incidentally, is taken up by P. 
Winch in his The Idea of a Social Science, 
thou~h not without modification. Cf .bibliography. 
2. Conseouently following a rule in Science is 
exactly the same as was noted with regard to 
lan~ai::i;e and to Mathematics. See pp.49-50. 
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shown to be qt best "misleading" because the notion of 
"empirical" is not actually a valid (final) point in a 
critical episemological inquiry. Rather, as Wittgenstein 
points out, we must realize that there is something 
which can be seen to ground the empirical - concept-
f ormation. 
The idea behind all of his discussions concerning 
concept-formation is that anything which we call 
"empirical" can only be known (or~ in the case of 
percention) through the concepts which we possess, 
which are in a sense "prior" to the empirical. It is 
here that we come to appreciate the importance of lang-
uage in its role for Wittgenstein as the limit of the 
world. 
Language here is more than the vehicle of com-
munication; it is held to be the essential tool re-
quired for concept-formation, and as such is the actual 
basis of the empirical. It is with regard to this point 
that Science is held to be an essentially linguistic 
activity. 
This view is not complete, however, until the in-
clusion of the notion of Forms of life. As I have argued, 
this notion is one of the most ambiguous and definitely 
the least discussed (by Wittgenstein) concept in the 
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Ph1losonh1cal Invest1Rattons. Yet. this concept ls per-
haps the most 1mnortant asnect of his later philosophy, 
esnecl~.lly with rei;ard to Science. because w1 thout 1 t 
Wittgenstein becomes merely another exponent of the con-
ventionalist point of view. 
Its presence, however, entails an abandonment of 
the position that men can fashion language and language-
games on an absolutely arbitrary basis. As Wittgenstein 
notes, "We do not agree in the language we use but 1n 
Forms of life". Quite obviously, then, the language-
game of Science must include the notion of Forms of life. 
I have tried to include it by suggesting that Forms of 
life affect, to a greater or lesser degree, all of the 
"laws" which are formulated by men and consequently that 
the laws of Science are themselves affected by Forms of 
life. It should be noted in this regard that I do not 
use the words "determine" or "directed" but rather 
"affected" because while it appears that there is some 
sort of relationship between Forms of life and the 
products of agreement reflected in various language-
games, Wittgenstein affords us no specific insight in-
to the actual nature of this relationship. Furthermore, 
an "affected" relationship does not appear to run 
counter to the notions of degrees of arbitrary decision 
on the part of language-game participants. 
The concluding view of Science is thus one of an 
essentially liguistic activity based on Forms of life 
in which an essentially "dependent" operation of veri-
fication is contiually being performed. The operation, 
of verification, of course, is recognized as the most 
prominent characteristic of the language-game of Science. 
9P 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, trans-
lated by G.E.M.Anscombe, The Macmillan 
Co., New York, 1953 
Wittgenstein, L. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathe-
matics, Edited by Wright, Rhees, and 
Anscombe, The M.I.T. Press, 1967 
Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans-
lated by Pears and McGuinness, Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1961 
Wittgenstein, L. The Blue & Brown Books, Barnes & Noble, 
New York, 1969 
Anscombe, G.E.M., An Introduction to Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus, Harper & Row, New York, 
1959 
Ayer, A.J., Lan~uage, Truth, and Logic, Dover Publications 
Inc., New York, 1946 
91 
Benacerraf and Putnam, Philosophy of Mathematics, 
Prentice-Hall, 1964 
Berne, E., Games People Play, Grove Press, New York, 
1964 
Black, M., A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 
Cornell University Press, 1964 
Cop1 and Beard, Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 
Macmillian, New York, 1966 
Cornforth, M., Science and Idealism, International Pub-
lishers, New York, 1947 
Fann, K.T., Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Man and his Phil-
osophy, Dell Publishing Co., 1967 
Fann, K.T., Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, 
University of California Press, Berkely 
and Los Angeles, 1971 
Griffin, J., Wittgenstein's Lo~ical Atornism, Oxford 
University Press, 1964 
Hallett, G., Wittgenstein's Definition of Meaning as 
Use, Fordham University Press, New York, 
92 
Klemke, E.D., Essays on Wittgenstein, University of 
Illinois Press, 1971 
Kuhn, T., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
University of Chicago Press, 1962 
Pears, D., Ludwig Wittge~stein, The Viking Press, New 
York, 1970 
Pitcher, G., Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investi-
gations, Doubleday, 1966 
Pole, D., The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Univer-
sity of London, The Athlone Press, 1958 
Specht, E.K., The Foundations of Wittgenstein's Late 
Philosophy, translated by D,E. Walford, 
Manchester University Press, 1969 
Warnoc~. G.J., En~lish Philosophy Since 1900, Oxford 
University Press, 1958 
Winch, P., The Idea of a Soci~l Science, London, 1958 
93 
Articles 
Albritton, R., "On Wittgenstein's Use of the Term 
'Criterion'", in Wittgenstein, The 
Philosophical Investigations, edited 
by G.Pitcher, Doubleday, 1966, 231-50 
Ambrose, A., "Wittgenstein on Some Questions in Found-
ations of Mathematics", in Ludwig Wittgen-
stein, The Man and his Philosophy,edited 
by K.T. Fann, Dell Publishing CO., 1967, 
265-83 
Anderson, A,R., "Mathematics and the 'Language Game"', 
in Philosonhy of Mathematics, edited by 
Benacerraf and Putnam, Prentice-Hall, 
1964, 481-90 
Bergmann, G., "The Glory and the Misery of Ludwig Witt-
genstein", in Essays on Wittgenstein, 
edited by E.D. Klemke, University of Il-
linois Press, 1971, 25-43 
Bernays, P., "Comments on Ludwig Wittgenstein's Re-
marks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 
in Benacerraf and Putnam, 510-28 
94 
Cavell, s., "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later 
Philosophy", in Pitcher, 151-85 
Chihara, C., "Mathematical Discovery and Concept Form-
ation", in Pitcher, 448-68 
Chihara, C., "Wittgenstein and Logical Compulsion", 
in Pitcher, 469-76 
Chihara., C. and Fodor, J.A., "Opera.tionalism and Ordi-
nary Language: A Critique 
of Wittgenstein", in Pitcher, 
384-419 
Cornforth, M., "The Philosophy of Wittgenstein", in his 
Science and Idealism, International Pub-
lishers, New York, 1947, 141-66 
Dummett, M., "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics", 
in Benacerraf and Putnam, 491-509 
Gill, J .H., "Wittgenstein's Concept of Truth", Inter-
national Philosophical Quarterly, 6(1966), 
71-80 
Hallie, P., "Wittgenstein's Grammatical-Empirical 
Distinction", Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol.· LX, No. 20, 1963 
95 
Hestor, M.B., "Metaphor and Aspect Seeing", Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 25 
(1966), 205-12 
Hunter, J.F.M., "'Forms of Life' in Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations", in 
Klemke, 273-97 
Lucas, J.R., "On Not Worshipping Facts", Philosophical 
Quarterly, 8(1958), 144-56 
McGuinness, B.F., "Philosophy of Science in the Trac-
tatus", International Revue of Phil-
osophy, 1969, 155-66 
O'Brien, D., "The Unity of Wittgenstein's Thought", in 
Fann, 380-404 
Petrie, H., "Science and Metaphysics: A Wittgensteinian 
Interpretation", in Klemke, 138-69 
Pitcher, G., "Wittgenstein, Nonsense and Lewis Carroll", 
in Fann, 315-35 
Proctor, G.L., "Scientific Laws, Scientific Objects, and 
the Tractatus", in Copi and Beard, 201-16 
Stroud, B., "Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity", in 
Pitcher, 477-496 
Zabeeh, F., "On Language Games and Forms of Life", in 
Klemke, 328-373 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The final copies have been examined by the director of 
the thesis/dissertation and the signiture which appears 
below verefies the fact that any necessary changes hav~ 
been incorporated and that the thesis/dissertation is 
now given final approval with reference to content and 
form. 
The thesis/dissertation is therefore accepted in part~a~,61'­
the requirements for the degree of/1{~ 
--H--
J::1~ I 6( t f7J 
~a_ 
ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE 
